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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a3(2)0).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
With respect to Dannie Green ("Green"), this appeal raises the following issues:
1.

Did the District Court correctly conclude that Helen Boyer, as a non-reliant

third party with no contractual relationship with Green, could not maintain a negligence
claim against Green?
2.

Did the District Court err in its determination, after a trial of the issues

between the adjoining landowners, that Green's survey complied with the standards of
the profession?
3.

Did the District Court err in its determination that the Appellant failed to

sustain its burden of proof on damages?
4.

May the Appellant challenge the factual findings of the trial court without

marshaling the evidence to show that the evidence was legally insufficient to support the
findings even when viewed in the light most favorable to the findings?
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
The applicable standard of appellate review on issue no. 1 above is correction of
error. This Court reviews the District Court's grant of summary judgment for
correctness. Thompson v. Jess, 1999 UT 22, f 12, 979 P.2d 322.
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The standard of appellate review on the District Court's factual findings on issue
no. 2 and issue no. 3 is the clearly erroneous standard. In reviewing the District Court's
factual findings, this Court should not disturb the factual findings unless they were
clearly erroneous. Johnson v. Higley, 1999 UT App 278, 989 P.2d 61. The clearly
erroneous standard does not permit findings to be overturned unless the great weight of
the evidence contradicts the finding. In re Knickerbocker, 912 P.2d 969, 979 (Utah
1996).
Although this Court reviews the District Court decision on issues of law for
correctness without according deference to the trial court's legal conclusions, under
standards of appellate review, this Court should affirm the District Court if its decision is
sustainable on any proper ground. The Utah Supreme Court has stated that:
Under the rules of appellate review, we affirm the trial court if we can
do so on any proper ground even if the court below assigned an
incorrect reason for its ruling.
Allphin Realty, Inc. v. Sine, 595 P.2d 860, 861 (Utah 1979). See also, Buehner Block Co.
v. U. W.C. Assoc, 752 P.2d 892 (Utah 1988). This rule of appellate review applies even if
the proper ground was not raised in or considered by the lower court, and even if the
proper ground is not urged on appeal. Goodsel v. Dept. of Business Reg., 523 P.2d 1230,
1232 (Utah 1974).
In reviewing the District Court's findings of fact, this Court must assume that the
record supports the findings since the Appellant has failed to marshal the evidence.
Eggett v. Wasatch Energy Corp., 2004 UT 28, f 10, 94 P.3d 193. "To mount a successful
2

attack upon a trial court's findings of fact, an appellant must first marshal all the evidence
in support of the finding and then demonstrate that the evidence is legally insufficient to
support the finding even when viewing it in a light most favorable to the court below."
Wilson Supply, Inc. v. Fradan Mfg. Corp., 2002 UT 94, f 21, 54 P.3d 1177.
Finally, any issue not raised in Appellant's main brief should not be considered by
this Court on appeal. Larson v. Overland Thrift and Loan, 818 P.2d 1316, 1320 (Utah
App. 1991).
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES
There are no statutes determinative of this appeal. The issues on this appeal are
governed by Utah case law and Rules 52(a) and 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
This case involves a property boundary line dispute between the Helen W. Boyer
Revocable Trust ("Helen Boyer") and Thomas Vern Boyer and Fewkes Canyon, LLC
("Tom Boyer"). Helen Boyer and Tom Boyer own adjoining sections of property, with
Helen Boyer owning section 31 and Tom Boyer owning section 32 of Township 3 North,
Range 6 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian. These property owners disputed the proper
location of a fence line between the two sections of property. The dispute had been
pending for many years, and most recently concerned a new fence erected by Tom Boyer.
Helen Boyer claimed that the new fence had been installed inside the eastern boundary of
Section 31, thereby encroaching upon her property. Helen Boyer filed this action against
3

Tom Boyer seeking an order requiring Tom Boyer to remove the new fence and install a
fence on the line where an old 1977-78 fence was previously located. Helen Boyer
further sought declaratory judgment, seeking an order declaring the rights of the
adjoining property owners and establishing the common boundary line.
By Second Amended Complaint, Helen Boyer joined Green as a defendant,
alleging that Green negligently performed a survey of Section 32 for Tom Boyer, the
adjoining property owner. The District Court granted Green's Motion for Summary
Judgment, ruling that Green owed no duty to Helen Boyer, an adjoining landowner, who
did not contract for the survey services and did not rely upon the survey services.
This matter went to trial between Helen Boyer and Tom Boyer, with the Court
considering several past surveys that concerned the common boundary line. After trial of
the evidence concerning the boundary line and the plaintiffs alleged damages, the
District Court determined the boundary line between Section 31 and 32 and quieted title
in each section to that boundary line. The Court further concluded that Helen Boyer had
not proven damages as claimed, and rejected the testimony about damages. The Court
ordered that the new fence erected by Tom Boyer be removed.
Course of Proceedings and Disposition at Trial Court
Helen Boyer filed the original complaint in this action against Tom Boyer on June
28, 2004. (R. 1.) A Second Amended Complaint was filed on August 4, 2005, naming
Green as a defendant, and asserting a negligence claim against Green in count III of the
Second Amended Complaint. (R.192, 197.) Green filed a Motion to Dismiss or
4

alternatively, Motion for Summary Judgment on August 31, 2005. (R.203.) Upon
completion of the briefing on Green's motion, a hearing was held on the motion on
February 6, 2006. (R.283.) The Court granted Green's Motion for Summary Judgment
by Ruling and Order dated February 7, 2006. (R.284-299; Addendum Exhibit 2.)
The case went to trial between Helen Boyer and Tom Boyer on September 27-29,
2006. By Memorandum Decision of the Court dated October 4, 2006, the Court quieted
titled in the disputed property and ordered the newly erected fence to be moved to match
the property line determined by the Court. (R.593-619.) The Court denied Helen
Boyer's claim for damages, finding that the damages were not proven by a preponderance
of the evidence. (R.626.) The final order and judgment of the Court was entered on
December 11, 2006. (R. 625.)
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Helen Boyer's statement of facts primarily sets forth the findings of fact entered
by the District Court following trial. Green does not dispute the findings of fact that are
accurately recited from the trial court's memorandum decision, and the trial court's
findings of fact provide background and much information concerning the claims
between Helen Boyer and Tom Boyer. However, a more limited statement of facts is
material to Helen Boyer's claim against Green. These facts are as follows:
1.

Helen Boyer is the record title owner of Section 31, Township 3 North,

Range 6 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian ("Section 31"). (R.193, 596.)
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2.

Tom Boyer is the record title owner of Section 32, Township 3 North,

Range 6 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian ("Section 32"). (R. 194.)
3.

Green surveyed the boundary of Section 32 for Tom Boyer at the request of

Tom Boyer. (R. 206-7, Exhibit A - Affidavit of Dannie Green.)
4.

In connection with Green's survey of the property for Tom Boyer, Green

filed a survey plat with the Summit County surveyor's office. He did not file any survey
or any other documents with Summit County other than the survey documents filed with
the Summit County surveyor's office under Title 17, Chapter 23 of the Utah Code. (R.
206-7, Exhibit A - Affidavit of Dannie Green.)
5.

Count III of the plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint asserted a claim

against Green based upon negligence. Specifically, Helen Boyer asserted that Green's
actions in connection with his survey were carried out negligently and unprofessionally.
(R. 197.)
6.

At trial, the District Court heard and considered testimony from numerous

witnesses concerning the boundary line between Sections 31 and 32, and specifically
concerning a common corner at the north edge of the properties. (R. 605.) The Court
heard and considered the testimony of various surveyors concerning surveys of the
property in question. (R. 603; R. 636 pp. 144-236, 250-292, 338-380; R. 637 pp. 488,
602-610.)
7.

After considering the evidence at trial, the District Court did not agree with

the line determined by Green's survey but concluded that "the process he engaged in was
6

not so flawed as to be without some merit and it was certainly not willfully incorrect.
The Green survey was not done outside the standards of the profession, it is merely found
to be incorrect based on the key finding that the government monument was not
sufficiently recognized or weighed by Green." (R. 613; and Appellant's Addendum.)
8.

In installing the 2003 fence, Tom Boyer pushed a fence line to allow access

to the presumed boundary line. Helen Boyer claimed that her property had been
damaged by this pushed line. Tom Boyer introduced recent photographs of the area
which showed that in the months between the installation of the fence in 2003 and the
time of trial, the natural vegetation had largely already grown back over the area where
the access road had been. (R.637, pp.628-29.)
9.

After trial, the District Court found the following as to the evidence

presented by Helen Boyer on damages:
19.
The evidence presented by plaintiff as to damages was not
persuasive. The cost to resurvey was not shown, and based on plaintiffs
position the Court cannot see why another survey would have been helpful
or would now be helpful. The evidence as to the cost to tear down the 2003
fence was some indication of damages, but the cost to erect a range fence
was not compelling such that the Court can find those costs are any
measure of damages. It was not shown why any new clearing must take
place, as when the 1977-78 fence was taken down in 2003, there still
remains, as shown by photographs, an area somewhat clear where a new
fence could be erected. That 1977-78 fence line is not overgrown such that
any estimate concerning clearing it again would be accurate. The bids to
again "clear" that already reasonably clear area are found not to be realistic.
As to the alleged damages for remediation, as to planting new aspen trees
or other vegetation, the evidence was not compelling just what was
removed when the 2003 fence was erected. Certainly some trees were
moved, but there was no sufficient evidence as to how many nor the value
of those. Moreover, it was not shown why indeed concerning this range
7

land there needs to be any remediation as evidently over the many years
this land has been in the Boyer family there has never been any such
reforesting or replanting of grasses. The damages must be proven, though
of course they need not be with specificity. They may not be the subject of
conjecture, and the Court believes the estimates provided are just that conjecture. The costs for halting erosion or the spread of weeds appears to
be the subject of government regulation, but it was not shown that moving
the 2003 fence back to the 1977-78 fence location would cause any erosion
or weed problems that must be budgeted for ten years. Moreover, this
being range land it is not clear to the Court that any such costs are
legitimate in any fashion. (R. 607-8; and Appellant's Addendum.)
10.

The fence, which was the subject of the boundary line dispute between

Helen Boyer and Tom Boyer, and which the District Court ordered to be removed, has
now been removed by Tom Boyer. (See Tom Boyer's Suggestion of Mootness, filed with
this Court on July 11, 2007.)
11.

Following the District Court's declaratory judgment declaring the common

boundary line and quieting title to the properties, Green filed an affidavit with the
Summit County Surveyor's office attaching the District Court's Memorandum Decision
so that the declaration of the common boundary by the District Court was made part of
the record of survey. (See certified copy of Affidavit of Dannie B. Green, on file with the
Summit County Surveyor as survey no. S0006440, attached as Addendum Exhibit 1.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This case involves a boundary dispute between adjoining landowners, Helen
Boyer and Tom Boyer. Green conducted a survey for Tom Boyer that concerned the
subject boundary line. Helen Boyer disputed the surveyed property line and sued Tom
Boyer for a judicial determination of the disputed line. Helen Boyer also attempted to
8

sue Green, contending that Green's survey was performed negligently. Helen Boyer
never used or relied upon the survey, but simply disputed the accuracy of the survey.
Several courts have analyzed negligence claims asserted by a landowner against a
surveyor hired by an adjoining landowner, where there was no contractual privity and
where the claimant had not relied upon the survey. These cases have determined that the
non-reliant third party has no cause of action based on negligence against the surveyor.
The cases essentially reason that absent reliance, a claim for negligent misrepresentation
fails.
The Utah case ofBushnell v. Sillitoe, 550 P.2d 1284 (Utah 1976) has similarly
indicated that a property owner in Helen Boyer's position has no cause of action against
the surveyor hired by another property owner, as she was not within the class of persons
for whose guidance the information was supplied.
Helen Boyer's remedy in the instant matter was to seek a declaratory judgment
determining the boundary line and quieting title. Her claim against Tom Boyer sought
just that, and the District Court determined the boundary line and quieted title to that line.
The case law relied upon by Helen Boyer does not provide her with a cause of
action against Green. The cases generally involved circumstances where a person was
damaged by their reasonable reliance upon the survey. Accordingly, unlike the present
case, the requisite elements of a cause of action for negligent misrepresentation were
present in the cases relied upon by Helen Boyer.

9

The public policy reasons urged by Helen Boyer also fail to support her cause of
action in this case. The District Court correctly determined that where there are
competing surveys and the court is called upon to determine the appropriate boundary
line, public policy does not require a cause of action in negligence against each of the
surveyors involved by each of the property owners. Indeed, public policy suggests the
opposite result under the circumstances of this case. Where the elements of a negligent
misrepresentation claim do not exist, the plaintiffs remedy should lie with the
declaratory judgment fixing the boundary and quieting title.
Subsequent to the dismissal of Green, this case went to trial between Helen Boyer
and Tom Boyer to determine the boundary line. As part of the evidence at trial, Helen
Boyer presented testimony from her own expert surveyors and also called Green as a
witness. Helen Boyer maintained her contention that Green's survey was in error and
that it was performed unprofessionally. In ruling on this issue, the District Court
disagreed with the result of Green's survey, but determined that Green's survey was not
done outside the standards of the survey profession. This determination by the District
Court operates to preclude, by the issue preclusion branch of res judicata or by the law of
the case doctrine, relitigation of the issue of Green's performance of the survey even if it
is determined on this appeal that some basis could exist for Helen Boyer's negligence
claim against Green. Helen Boyer contended that Green's survey was unprofessionally
done, and the District Court determined the issue against her after a trial of the facts. The
District Court's determination of this issue should be upheld on appeal as it involved
10

findings of fact, which are supported by the evidence and are not clearly erroneous.
Moreover, Helen Boyer, as the appellant, has failed to marshal the evidence in favor of
the court's determination, and the court's ruling should be upheld on that basis.
At trial, Helen Boyer failed to prove damages. The District Court ordered that the
fence be moved, and Tom Boyer has now moved the fence in accordance with the order.
The court otherwise found the alleged damages to be speculative and unsupported. This
finding as to damages should be upheld on appeal as the evidence showed that Helen
Boyer had sustained no damages. The great weight of the evidence is certainly not
contrary to that finding, but indeed supports the finding, and Helen Boyer has failed to
marshal the evidence on the issue.
ARGUMENT
I.

HELEN BOYER HAD NO CONTRACTUAL RELATIONSHIP WITH
GREEN, AND DID NOT USE OR RELY UPON GREEN'S SURVEY. AS A
NON-RELIANT THIRD PARTY WITH NO CONTRACTUAL
RELATIONSHIP, HELEN BOYER'S NEGLIGENCE CLAIM AGAINST
GREEN FAILS.
Green performed his survey work at the request of Tom Boyer, and Green's duties

accordingly ran toward Tom Boyer. Green had no contractual relationship with Helen
Boyer, and owed no independent duty to Helen Boyer. In order to prevail on a
negligence claim under Utah law, a plaintiff must establish, among other things, that the
defendant owed the plaintiff a duty of care. Absent a showing that the defendant owed
any duty, the claim of negligence has no merit. See Young v. Salt Lake City School
District, 2002 UT 64, f 12, 52 P.3d 1230. The question of whether a duty exists is a
11

question of law to be determined by the Court and a motion to dismiss for failure to state
a claim is properly granted where the defendant owed no duty to the plaintiff. Ramsey v.
Hancock, 2003 UT App 319, HI 8, 20, 79 P.3d 423.
Several cases around the country have analyzed negligence claims brought by
landowners against surveyors hired by adjoining landowners, and have held that the
surveyors owed no duty to the landowner lacking contractual privity, and that claims of
negligence and negligent misrepresentation failed for a lack of duty and a lack of
reliance. In DeCapua v. Lambacher, 663 N.E. 2d 972 (Ohio App. 1995), a property
owner brought an action for negligent misrepresentation against a surveyor hired by a
neighboring property owner to establish the boundary line between the neighboring
properties. The Court acknowledged that Ohio had recognized the doctrine of negligent
misrepresentation as stated in section 552 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. The
Court held, however, that the duty acknowledged by section 552 does not extend to
persons who do not rely upon the information, and hence does not extend to adjoining
property owners who dispute the survey conducted. See DeCapua at 974.
In Gipson v. Slagle, 820 S.W. 2d 595 (Mo. App. 1991), the Missouri Court of
Appeals similarly held that a surveyor hired by a landowner owed no duty of care to
adjoining landowners. In Gipson, Mijal and the Gipsons were abutting property owners.
Mijal hired a surveyor, Slagle, to perform a survey of the west boundary line of MijaPs
property, which was a common boundary between Mijal's property and Gipson's
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property. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the plaintiffs
negligence claims against the surveyor, stating:
Here, as in Baublit, the Gipsons failed to show that the surveyor owed a
duty of care to them or that they had relied upon the survey. The survey at
issue was prepared by Slagle on behalf of the Mijals and there was no
allegation of any action taken by the Gipsons in reliance upon the survey.
In fact, the Gipsons disputed the boundary line established by the survey,
rather than relied upon it.
Gipson, at 598.
Other cases around the country analyzing similar situations involving claims by
landowners against surveyors, where the surveyor was hired by an adjoining landowner,
have determined that the surveyor owed no duty to the adjoining landowner. See, e.g.,
Lindey's, Inc. v. Goodover, 872 P.2d 764 (Mont. 1994). Goodover hired surveyor Greg
Martinsen to locate the boundary between Goodover's and Lindey's property, and
plaintiff Lindey's hired a different surveyor. Lindey's filed suit alleging that Martinsen
was negligent, and contended that Martinsen had a general duty to anyone affected by his
survey. Lindey's also argued that Martinsen was negligent because he had an ongoing
duty to change a survey if it was in error. The Montana Supreme Court concluded that
Lindey's "failed to sustain its burden to show that an issue of material fact exists or that
Martinsen owed it a legal duty. If no duty exists, there can be no tort of negligence." See
Lindey 's, at 767. See also, Carlotta v. T. R. Stark & Associates, Inc., 470 A.2d 838, 840
(Md. App. 1984), ("a surveyor of a disputed boundary line does not owe a duty of care to
a non-reliant third party adjacent landowner.")
13

The Utah Supreme Court has also addressed this issue and has indicated that a
surveyor hired by one landowner owes no duty to the adjoining landowners. In Bushnell
v. Sillitoe, 550 P.2d 1284 (Utah 1976), the Utah Supreme Court determined that a
surveyor hired by one landowner owes no duty to the adjoining landowners. Appellant
Helen Boyer relies upon certain language in Bushnell quoted from an A.L.R. annotated
article, but misreads the law actually recognized and established by the Utah Supreme
Court in Bushnell. Bushnell states, in no uncertain terms, that a party in Helen Boyer's
position has no claim against the surveyor hired by an adjoining landowner. In Bushnell,
plaintiff Bushnell brought an action against a neighboring property owner, Sillitoe,
alleging encroachment. Bushnell joined the builder of the Sillitoes' home, who had
constructed the home and sold it to the Sillitoes. Bushnell also joined Sandberg
Engineers, who had surveyed the property for the builder. The builder filed a cross-claim
against Sandberg, alleging that it had employed Sandberg to survey and stake the
boundaries. A stipulation was entered in the case, whereby Bushnell's action was
dismissed, and only the cross-claim by Sillitoes against the builder and Sandberg
remained. The issue before the Supreme Court actually involved an issue of contribution
between the builder and the surveyor. In ruling upon this issue, the Court stated that
"Sandberg [the surveyor] owed no duty to the adjoining landowners, the Bushnells."
Bushnell, at 1285. After reciting the case of Rozny v. Marnul, 250 N.E. 2d 656 (111.
1969), the Court in Bushnell again reiterated that:

14

In the instant matter, Bushnells are not within the class of persons for
whose guidance the information was supplied by Sandberg. Thus, Sandberg
could not be held liable to Bushnells.
Id. at 1286. (Emphasis added.)
The above determination by the Utah Supreme Court in Bushnell demonstrates
that Helen Boyer does not have a cause of action against Green in the instant matter,
where Green performed his survey work for Tom Boyer, an adjoining landowner. Helen
Boyer had no contractual relationship with Green, and Green therefore owed no
contractual duties to Helen Boyer. As to any alleged tort duty, Helen Boyer was not
within the class of persons for whose guidance the survey was supplied by Green, and
Green therefore could not be held liable to Helen Boyer, as indicated by the Supreme
Court in Bushnell Furthermore, Helen Boyer did not rely upon or use Green's survey in
any way, but instead contested the survey, and therefore could not maintain a cause of
action under section 552 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, having not relied upon the
survey. The District Court therefore correctly concluded that Helen Boyer could not
maintain a negligence claim against Green.
Helen Boyer argues on appeal that her property was encumbered by Green's
survey, that Green refused to amend or otherwise correct the alleged inaccuracies, and
that the District Court's ruling in favor of Green precluded her from seeking any
meaningful redress. (See Appellant's Brief, p. 22.) To the contrary, Helen Boyer had a
remedy and pursued her remedy against the adjoining property owner, Tom Boyer. As
the District Court ruled in deciding Green's motion for summary judgment, where there
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are competing surveys in the case and the court is called upon to determine the proper
boundary and quiet title to the properties, the declaratory judgment claim provided the
plaintiff with a remedy. (See District Court's Ruling and Order, dated February 7, 2006,
pp. 11-13, R. 294-296; Addendum Exhibit 2.) At trial, the District Court did just that determined the boundary and quieted title in the properties.
Following the District Court's declaratory judgment, Green filed an affidavit with
the record of survey in the Summit County Surveyor's Office, attaching the District
Court's Memorandum Decision and Order and Judgment, which judicially determined
the boundary line. See Affidavit of Dannie B. Green, filed with the Summit County
Recorder, designated as depositor for survey plats in compliance with Section 17-23-17,
Utah Code, Addendum Exhibit 1. (A certified copy of the Affidavit as filed with the
Summit County Surveyor is attached as Addendum Exhibit 1.)
Green urges this Court to take judicial notice of the Affidavit of Dannie B. Green
filed with the Summit County Surveyor. While the taking of judicial notice on appeal is
discretionary and will be taken only where there is a compelling countervailing principle
to be served, Green submits that the exercise of such discretion would be appropriate
here. Finlayson v. Finlayson, 874 P.2d 843, 847 (Utah App. 1994). Pursuant to Utah
Rule of Evidence 201(b), the filing of the affidavit is a fact that is not subject to
reasonable dispute and is capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to
sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned. Green submits that taking
judicial notice of the filing of the affidavit does not run contrary to procedural policy that
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prohibits a party from raising issues on appeal that were not raised below, since the fact is
not one that could have been raised in the court below. The affidavit was filed with the
Summit County record of survey following the District Court's final order and judgment
declaring the boundary line so that the District Court's determination of the boundary
could be accurately set forth and made a part of the survey records affecting the subject
properties.
As shown by Appellee Tom Boyer, the fence has been moved to the boundary line
established by the declaratory judgment, as ordered by the District Court. (See Appellee
Tom Boyer's Suggestion of Mootness, on file with this appeal, and Appellee Tom
Boyer's Brief, p.2.) The District Court granted the declaratory relief sought by Helen
Boyer. The common boundary line was determined by the District Court, title was
quieted, the record of survey in Summit County reflects the District Court's
determination of the boundary line, and the fence has been moved in accordance with the
court's order. Helen Boyer has thus obtained her appropriate remedy.
Appellant Helen Boyer's negligence claim against Green fails as Green did not
owe Helen Boyer a duty as an adjoining property owner. Helen Boyer did not rely upon
Green's survey, but instead relied upon other surveys. As a non-reliant third party, Helen
Boyer had no claim against Green according to the law set forth by the Utah Supreme
Court in Bushnell v. Sillitoe, and recognized by other courts around the country. See,
e.g., DeCapua v. Lambacher, 663 N.E.2d 972 (Ohio App. 1995; Gipson v. Single, 820
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S.W.2d 595 (Mo. App. 1991); Lindey's Inc. v. Goodover, 872 P.2d 764 (Mont. 1994);
and Carlotta v. T.R. Stark & Associates, Inc., 470 A.2d 838 (Md. App. 1984).
II.

THE CASES RELIED UPON BY HELEN BOYER DO NOT SUPPORT
HER CLAIM AGAINST GREEN, AS SHE WAS A NON-RELIANT THIRD
PARTY, HAVING NO CONTRACTUAL RELATIONSHIP WITH GREEN.
Helen Boyer first relies upon the Utah case of Bushnell v. Sillitoe, 550 P.2d 1284

(Utah 1976). As discussed, supra at p. 14, Helen Boyer misreads the Court's discussion
and holding in Bushnell, and simply relies upon language recited from an A.L.R. article
in Bushnell The Court in Bushnell stated that "Sandberg [the surveyor] owed no duty to
the adjoining landowners, the Bushnells." Id. at 1285. The Court determined that the
Bushnells were not within the class of persons for whose guidance the information was
supplied by the surveyor, and that the surveyor could therefore not be held liable to the
Bushnells in tort. Helen Boyer is similarly situated to the Bushnells, and Green cannot be
held liable to Helen Boyer in the instant matter.
Helen Boyer next relies upon the case of Rozny v. Marnul, 250 N.E.2d 656 (111.
1969). Helen Boyer's reliance on Rozny is also misplaced. The plaintiff in Rozny was
the vendee of the person for whom the survey was made. Thus, the plaintiff in Rozny
was in the chain of title to the property for which the survey was conducted, and was
within the class of persons for whose guidance the survey information was supplied.
Moreover, the court's holding in Rozny was based in part upon an express guarantee
provided by the surveyor. Id. at 663. Rozny therefore does not support Helen Boyer's
position in this case.
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The case of Hutchinson v. Dubeau, 289 S.E.2d 4 (Ga. App. 1982) also fails to
support Helen Boyer's claim against Green. In Hutchinson, a Georgia statute imposed
liability on the defendants so long as the plaintiff relied upon the survey. Hutchinson is
therefore based upon a Georgia statute, which does not govern here. Moreover, the
surveyor, Dubeau, was employed to prepare the plat for the plaintiffs predecessor in title,
who subsequently sold the land to the plaintiff. Hutchinson stands for the proposition
that a surveyor may be liable to third persons with whom he has no privity for negligent
misrepresentation where the surveyor knew or should have known that such third persons
would use or rely upon the plat in subsequent transactions involving the property. In
dicta, the court in Hutchinson recognized that certain authority existed for holding a
surveyor liable to third parties for negligent misrepresentations "provided that the
surveyor knew or should have known that such third persons would use and rely upon the
plat in subsequent transactions involving the property." Id. at 5. (Emphasis added.)
Here again, Helen Boyer in the instant matter was not within the class of persons for
whose guidance the Green survey was supplied, and Helen Boyer did not rely upon or use
the Green survey. Hutchinson fails to support Helen Boyer's claim.
Helen Boyer's reliance upon Kent v. Bartlett, 122 Cal. Rptr. 615 (Cal. App. 1975)
and Biakanja v. Irving, 320 P.2d 16 (Cal. 1958) is similarly misplaced. In Kent, the
plaintiff again was in the chain of title, having purchased the property in question from
the person who had hired the surveyor. The Court held that the absence of privity of
contract between the parties did not preclude the plaintiffs claim of negligence against
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the surveyor, reasoning that the surveyor "could reasonably anticipate that it would be
used and relied upon by persons such as plaintiffs, who purchased the property surveyed
by defendant." Id. at 619. Again, the necessary element of reliance is lacking in the
instant matter.
Biakanja involved a negligence claim for the preparation of a will by a person who
was determined to be engaged in the unauthorized practice of law. The California Court
held that such conduct should be discouraged and determined that the beneficiary of the
will would have a cause of action against the drafter of the will. The factors analyzed by
the California Court in Biakanja are not governing here. Nevertheless, the public policy
factors analyzed in Biakanja would not lead to a cause of action against Green in the
instant case. In ruling on Green's motion for summary judgment, the District Court ruled
as follows:
. . . The court, as a matter of public policy, determines there is not a duty
owed by a surveyor such that a tort of negligence will lie whenever a
property owner claims the survey is incorrect under circumstances such as
this case. If any adjoining property owner could claim negligence against a
surveyor who disagrees with other surveyors, there would be no reason
whatever that defendant [Tom] Boyer could not file a negligence claim
against Kent Wilde or others who performed a previous survey.
* * *

However, on balance, as a matter of public policy, where there [sic]
allegations in this second amended complaint that will allow the court to
determine the "correctness" of the various surveys that have been
performed, plaintiff is not without a remedy. She is without a remedy
against Green, or any other surveyor whose product disagrees with the
product of other surveyors, but she is not without a remedy.
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If the courts were to allow, under the circumstances of this case,
such a negligence claim to stand, defendant Boyer could file a negligence
claim against any and all other surveyors who disagreed with the survey he
commissioned, claiming they were negligently performed and contain
incorrect information which over the years has caused damage to Boyer, as
"taking" his property and being an improper encumbrance on his property.

In this case, each surveyor will presumably testify, and the court will
make findings as to the "correct" boundary line, and issue declaratory
judgment as to whether the boundary is where Green says it is or whether it
is somewhere else, where other surveyors say it is. That does not mean that
each surveyor should be liable if their work is incorrect, especially in this
situation where there are remedies to find the "correct" boundary.
Allowing negligence suits in such situations as this would create havoc.
. . . Here, where there are competing surveys over a boundary line, there is
no duty of a surveyor that is owed to one such as plaintiff, an adjoining
property owner.
(District Court's Ruling and Order, dated February 7, 2006, R. 292-295; and Addendum
Exhibit 2.)
In this case, Helen Boyer did not use or rely upon Green's survey, just as Tom
Boyer did not use or rely upon other surveys. The District Court correctly concluded that
negligence claims by adjoining, non-reliant, property owners should not be permitted
under the circumstances of this case. To allow such claims could indeed result in a "freefor-all" of negligence claims against surveyors retained by adjoining property owners
attempting to establish their property rights. Under different circumstances, such as those
where the requisite elements for a claim of negligent misrepresentation are present, a
different result may be warranted. Here, however, the elements for negligent
misrepresentation do not exist.
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The cases relied upon by Helen Boyer primarily address situations where the party
making the claim against the surveyor purchased the property in question from the
landowner who hired the surveyor. The plaintiffs in those cases relied directly upon the
survey and a cause of action for negligent misrepresentation was acknowledged despite
the lack of direct contractual privity. Those cases do not provide Helen Boyer with a
cause of action against Green in the instant matter. Helen Boyer did not rely upon
Green's survey, and in fact, contested the survey. Helen Boyer's status in the instant
matter is therefore much like the plaintiffs' status in the cases of DeCapua v. Lambacher,
663 N.E.2d 972 (Ohio App. 1995), Gipson v. Slagle, 820 S.W.2d 595 (Mo. App. 1991),
and Lindey's, Inc. v. Goodover, 872 P.2d 764 (Mont. 1994), which hold that a non-reliant
third party has no cause of action against the surveyor hired by an adjoining landowner.
The single Utah case that has examined this issue, Bushnell v. Sillitoe, has similarly
stated that a surveyor hired by one landowner owes no duty to the adjoining landowners.
The case of West v. Inter-Financial, Inc., 2006 UT App 222, 139 P.3d 1059 does
not lead to a different result. West held that a real estate appraiser, like other real estate
professionals, has an independent duty to non-contracting parties who rely upon the work
of the appraiser. This Court in West cited prior Utah Supreme Court cases where the
Supreme Court had "under certain circumstances recognized that economic losses are
recoverable in tort under section 552 [of the Restatement (Second) of Torts]." West, at
If 13, quoting SME Industries, Inc. v. Thompson, Ventulett, Stainback & Assoc, Inc., 2001
UT 54, 28 P.3d 669. "For example, in Price-Orem Investment Co. v. Rollins, Brown &
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Gunnell, Inc., 713 P.2d 55 (Utah 1986), the supreme court held that the plaintiff was not
barred from pursuing its negligent misrepresentation action against a defendant surveyor
even though the party was not in privity of contract." Id. In Price-Orem, the surveyor
had surveyed and staked buildings for a shopping center being developed by Price-Orem
Investment. The surveyor's contract was with the general contractor, John Price
Associates. The Supreme Court upheld Price-Orem Investment's cause of action for
negligent misrepresentation against the surveyor despite the lack of contractual privity.
The court specifically recognized the viability of a cause of action for negligent
misrepresentation against the surveyor, indicating that both John Price Associates and
Price-Orem Investment "were entitled to reasonably rely upon the information provided
by [the surveyor]. And Price-Orem, as the owner of the property for whose benefit the
shopping center was being constructed, was clearly a party whose justifiable reliance
upon the accuracy of the survey might be reasonably foreseen." Price-Orem, at p. 59-60.
Importantly, the tort cause of action recognized was one of negligent misrepresentation.
The developer was within the group of persons for whose benefit the survey was
performed and the developer reasonably relied upon the survey.
In West, this Court recognized that under section 552 of the Restatement (Second)
of Torts, a real estate appraiser "is liable to 'a limited group of persons for whose benefit
and guidance he [or she] intended to supply' the information if it justifiably relied on it."
West, at f 27. Unlike the circumstances in West and Price-Orem, Helen Boyer is not
within the group of persons for whose benefit the Green survey was performed.
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Moreover, Helen Boyer did not rely upon Green's survey. The circumstances here are far
different in that Helen Boyer contested Green's survey and had other surveyors upon
whom she relied. Helen Boyer does not have a claim for negligent misrepresentation
against Green, just as Tom Boyer would not have a claim for negligent misrepresentation
against surveyors hired by Helen Boyer.
The law set forth in West should not apply to a non-reliant third party. Numerous
decisions around the country have held that a non-reliant third party has no cause of
action against a surveyor hired by an adjoining landowner. The Utah Supreme Court, in
Bushnell v. Sillitoe, 550 P.2d 1284, has also stated that a surveyor hired by one
landowner owes no duty to the adjoining landowners. Green acknowledges that the law
set forth in Price-Orem recognizes a negligent misrepresentation claim where the facts
give rise to such a cause of action. However, where the claimant is not within the group
of persons for whose guidance the information was supplied and where there is no
reliance, the tort of negligent misrepresentation is not viable. Bushnell v. Sillitoe governs
the instant matter. As set forth in Bushnell, and other cases around the country, such as
DeCapua v. Lambacher, Gipson v. Slagle, and Lindey 's v. Goodover dealing with claims
against surveyors by non-reliant third parties, there is no duty owed to a non-reliant third
party property owner.
The cases relied upon by Helen Boyer do not govern or apply to this matter, and
the claim against Green was accordingly properly dismissed by the District Court.
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III.

AFTER A TRIAL OF THE ISSUES BETWEEN THE ADJOINING
LANDOWNERS, THE DISTRICT COURT DETERMINED THAT
GREEN'S SURVEY WAS NOT OUTSIDE THE STANDARDS OF THE
PROFESSION.
After the dismissal of Helen Boyer's claim against Green, this case went to a

bench trial before the Honorable Bruce Lubeck for three days. (R.635-637.) The Court
considered the testimony of various surveyors who had performed surveys affecting both
Section 31 and Section 32, owned by Helen Boyer and Tom Boyer, respectively. The
Court heard and considered the testimony of Helen Boyer's two expert witness surveyors,
John Stahl (R.637, pp. 488-539.), and Kent Wilde (R. 636, pp. 338-368.), and also heard
and considered Green's testimony concerning the boundary line in question. (R.636,
pp. 144-237; R. 637, pp.602-610.) Indeed, the court heard testimony about numerous
surveys that concerned the common north corner of the properties. (R.637, p.539.) After
considering all of the evidence, the Court made the following findings of fact pertinent to
Green's performance of the survey work:
16.
. . . To the Court all surveyors who testified seemed to be sincere
and capable. It is apparent that surveying is not "rocket science" in that
there is only one correct answer, but there is some disagreement even
amongst experienced surveyors. Various notes from the past may be
interpreted differently,....
Green explained his procedures and the reasons for his results. . . .
Green explained that he considered the previous surveys, but also what are
called the topographic calls, the original field notes from the 1874 U.S.
survey, the conveyance deeds, the 1967 topographic map, the acreage
involved, as well as other factors. He concluded that the 1977-78 fence
was not the boundary line but the boundary line is where the 2003 fence
was erected by Tom Boyer after the Green survey. The original plat of
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1874 shows Section 31 is "short" and consists of 623.6 acres and Section
32 consists of 640 acres.
* * *

18.
. . . The [original 1874 field] notes are found by the Court to be
inaccurate as to distances and thus the corners which were established by
following those notes as Green did were inaccurate. Often the distances
were off as much as 500 feet, which would and does account for the
discrepancy Green states he found. Because the field notes were incorrect
as plaintiffs expert opined, Green's reliance on them caused his final
conclusion to be incorrect.
(District Court's Memorandum Decision, dated October 4, 2006, Findings of Fact nos.
16, 18, R. 603-607.)
Ultimately, based upon its findings of fact, the District Court agreed with other
surveyors and disagreed with Green's survey, declaring the boundary between Section 31
and Section 32 to be along the old fence line. While the District Court disagreed with
Green's survey, the Court expressly determined that Green's survey was not done outside
the standards of the profession. The Court's pertinent conclusions of law, based upon its
findings of fact, are as follows:
2.
. . . There is certainly a conflict whether the stone was at a common
boundary, but on balance the Court concludes it was. . . . When Green
conducted his survey in 2003 he gave weight to that evidence of a stone
being found and observed by others, but Green gave it insufficient weight
in the Court's view. . . . While Green did consider those things, he
considered other evidences as being more important, and to the Court that
is the principal reason the Court rejects his survey as showing the true
boundary. The Green survey was not nearly as faulty as plaintiff alleges,
however. Green simply disagreed with others and gave insufficient weight
to the government stone and evidence that supported the presence of that
stone, and he gave increased weight to his own "retracing" efforts and
relied too heavily on questionable field notes over the government stone.
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. . . Green's survey, while the Court concludes it was not sufficiently based
on clear and available evidence of a section corner monument, was not
done in willful disregard of standard principles of surveying. It was merely
wrong and based on other evidences Green felt more important than the
government monument evidence. Indeed, survey principles do not call for
a "blind" adherence to a government monument if that monument is too
questionable according to all evidence. However, as the Court understands
it, Green used the 1874 field notes and examined terrain and topography
and naturally occurring signs. Certainly those would change to some extent
in 130 years. The process Green followed is indeed not dissimilar to what
the Court is now undertaking in this and any other case. An examination of
all evidence is made and a conclusion is reached. Green did that though in
a way that others did not agree with and that this Court does not agree with,
in that the key evidence, the government stone, was not properly weighed
by Green. This Court does not agree with Green's result, or conclusion, but
the process he engaged in was not so flawed as to be without some merit
and it was certainly not willfully incorrect. The Green survey was not done
outside the standards of the profession, it is merely found to be incorrect
based on the key finding that the government monument was not
sufficiently recognized or weighed by Green.
(District Court's Memorandum Decision, dated October 4, 2006, Conclusion of Law no.
2, R. 610-613.)
Based upon a trial of the evidence, the Court found and concluded that Green's
survey work did not fall outside the standards in the survey profession, although the
Court disagreed with the boundary line determined in Green's survey. This
determination by the trial court came after hearing much testimony from several different
surveyors concerning the disputed property line, and after hearing argument from Helen
Boyer's counsel, contending that Green did not comply with standards in the profession.
(R.637, pp. 651-657.) Having presented its evidence concerning Green's survey, and
having contended that the survey was erroneous and performed unprofessionally, Helen
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Boyer is bound by the District Court's determination that Green's survey did not fall
below the standard of care in the surveying industry. Thus, even assuming some duty
owed to Helen Boyer by Green, Green would not be liable to Helen Boyer, by virtue of
the law of the case doctrine or the issue preclusion branch of res judicata, as the District
Court has determined that Green's survey complied with the standards in the survey
profession. The "law of the case" doctrine provides that a decision made on an issue
during one stage of a case is binding in successive stages of the same case. Thurston v.
Box Elder County, 892 P.2d 1034, 1037 (Utah 1995). Under one branch of the doctrine,
a court is justified in refusing to reconsider matters resolved in a prior ruling in the same
case for reasons of efficiency and consistency. Id. at 1038. Under issue preclusion, the
relitigation of factual issues that have once been litigated and decided is precluded even if
a different claim for relief is brought, and even if only "the party against whom the
doctrine is asserted was a party or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication."
Trimble Real Estate v. Monte Vista Ranch, 758 P.2d 451, 453 (Utah App. 1988), quoting
Copper State Thrift and Loan v. Bruno, 735 P.2d 387, 390 (Utah App. 1987).
Applied to the instant matter, the law of the case doctrine or issue preclusion
should preclude Helen Boyer from relitigating the issue of Green's conduct in performing
his survey for Tom Boyer. Although Green was not a party to the case at the time of
trial, nothing prevented Helen Boyer from putting on evidence concerning Green's
survey or the basis for Green's survey, and Helen Boyer in fact called Green as a witness
during her case in chief. She also presented testimony from her two surveyor experts,
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John Stahl and Kent Wilde, contending that Green's survey was in error. (R. 636, pp.
338-368; R. 637, pp. 488-539, 641-644.) The District Court fully considered Green's
performance of the survey for Tom Boyer, and made findings and conclusions regarding
Green's performance. Helen Boyer is precluded from relitigating this issue.
Accordingly, the District Court's ruling dismissing Helen Boyer's claim against Green
should be affirmed even if some theoretical basis exists for a cause of action against
Green in favor of Helen Boyer, as the District Court found after a trial of the issues that
the survey conducted by Green was not outside the standards in the survey profession.
The District Court's determination of this issue was based upon its findings of fact
at trial, which should not be disturbed unless they are found to be clearly erroneous.
Johnson v. Higley, supra. "Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary
evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to
the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses." Utah R. Civ.
Proc. 52(a). "The trial court is not required to recite each indicia of reasoning that leads
to its conclusion, nor is it required to marshal the evidence in support of them." In re
Knickerbocker, 912 P.2d 969, 979 (Utah 1996). Although the trial court need not
marshal the evidence to support its findings, the appellant must marshal the evidence if it
seeks to overturn the trial court's findings. Wilson Supply, Inc. v. Fradan Mfg. Corp.,
2002 UT 94, f 21, 54 P.3d 1177. Because Appellant Helen Boyer has failed to marshal
the evidence on this issue, the findings have not been properly challenged on appeal and
the findings must be upheld.
29

IV.

HELEN BOYER FAILED TO PROVE ANY DAMAGES, AND IS
PRECLUDED BY THE LAW OF THE CASE OR BY THE DOCTRINE OF
ISSUE PRECLUSION FROM RELITIGATING THE ISSUE OF
DAMAGES.
After considering the evidence on damages offered by Helen Boyer at trial, the

District Court determined that no damages had been proven. Indeed, there were no
damages sustained, and the declaratory judgment fixing the boundary line and quieting
title provided Helen Boyer with the necessary remedy. The fence was then moved by
Tom Boyer and there is nothing further to remedy. In its finding of fact no. 19, the
District Court found as follows:
19.
The evidence presented by plaintiff as to damages was not
persuasive. . . . As to the alleged damages for remediation, as to planting
new aspen trees or other vegetation, the evidence was not compelling just
what was removed when the 2003 fence was erected. Certainly some trees
were moved, but there was no sufficient evidence as to how many nor the
value of those. Moreover, it was not shown why indeed concerning this
range land there needs to be any remediation as evidently over the many
years this land has been in the Boyer family there has never been any such
reforesting or replanting of grasses. The damages must be proven, though
of course they need not be with specificity. They may not be the subject of
conjecture, and the Court believes the estimates provided are just that conjecture.
(District Court's Memorandum Decision, dated October 4, 2006, Finding of Fact
no. 19, R. 607, 608.) (Emphasis added.) In Conclusion of Law No. 5, the District Court
stated:
5.
Plaintiff has not proven damages as claimed. The cost of removing
the fence erected in 2003 was not shown convincingly, nor was any need
for remediation shown convincingly. The evidence presented was too
speculative and not based on sufficient foundation such that it convinces
the Court that there needs to be any erosion or weed control, or that a range
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fence or any other fence would cost anywhere near what the plaintiffs
evidence showed. The Court rejects all the testimony about damages and
concludes that plaintiff has not proven any damages resulting from the
removal of the 1977-78 fence or the erection of the 2003 fence.
(District Court's Memorandum Decision, dated October 4, 2006, Conclusion of Law no.
5, R. 615,616.)
Having made the factual finding that the plaintiffs evidence on damages was
based upon conjecture, and having determined that the evidence was too speculative, the
District Court's decision precludes Helen Boyer from relitigating the issue of damages by
the law of the case and/or the issue preclusion doctrines. As set forth, supra, the
doctrines of law of the case and/or issue preclusion preclude the relitigation of these
issues by Helen Boyer. Thus, even assuming a potentially viable cause of action by
Helen Boyer against Green, Helen Boyer failed to prove any damages in the trial between
the Boyer parties, and is bound by the factual findings as to damages. Without damages,
any potential claim of negligence against Green fails as a matter of law.
Following entry of the District Court's final order and judgment, Tom Boyer
removed the encroaching fence as ordered by the court, and the fence has been placed
along the line declared in the order and judgment. {See Appellant's Brief, p. 24.)
V.

THE APPELLANT, HELEN BOYER HAS FAILED TO MARSHAL THE
EVIDENCE ON DAMAGES.
In the interest of brevity and to avoid duplication, Green hereby incorporates and

adopts by reference the arguments and authorities contained in the brief of Appellees
Tom Boyer and Fewkes Canyon, LLC on the issue of the Appellant's failure to marshal
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the evidence on damages. The appellate court "does not review the trial court's factual
findings where the party challenging those findings fails to marshal the evidence.
Instead, the court of appeals must 'assume that the record supports the findings of the
trial court.'" Eggett v. Wasatch Energy Corp., 2004 UT 28, f 10, 94 P.3d 193. As the
Appellant has failed to marshal the evidence on damages, to show that the trial court's
findings were clearly erroneous, the appeal from the trial court's decision on damages
fails. The trial court's decision on the issues of damages should therefore be affirmed.
CONCLUSION
The negligence claim against Green fails, as Helen Boyer was a non-reliant third
party and therefore cannot satisfy the elements required for negligent misrepresentation.
Her remedy was to seek a declaratory judgment for a judicial determination of the
disputed boundary, which is exactly what occurred in the District Court. At trial, the
court determined that Green did not breach the standard of care in the surveying
profession. The law of the case doctrine and/or issue preclusion prevent Helen Boyer
from relitigating this issue. The determination is based upon findings supported by the
evidence, which findings are not clearly erroneous and have not been properly challenged
by the Appellant.
Helen Boyer's asserted damages were found to be based upon conjecture. Indeed,
there were no actual damages. The District Court's findings as to damages are supported
by the evidence. They are not clearly erroneous, and were not challenged by Helen
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Boyer by marshaling the evidence. Without damages, any theoretical negligence cause
of action against Green further fails.
The District Court properly granted Green summary judgment. Green requests
that this Court affirm the District Court's order granting summary judgment to Green,
and requests that this Court affirm the District Court's findings and conclusions with
regard to Green's performance of the survey and affirm the findings and conclusions with
regard to damages.
DATED this Jl - day of October, 2007.

PLANT, CHRISTENSEN & KANELL

^ 6 H N N. BRAITHWAITE
Attorney for Appellee Dannie Green
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ADDENDUM
Certified copy of Affidavit of Dannie B. Green, on file with
the Summit County Surveyor as survey no. S0006440

Exhibit 1

District Court's Ruling and Order, dated February 7, 2006
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AFFIDAVIT OF DANNIE B. GREEN
STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF \ / V ^ W w , W

)
:ss
)

Dannie B. Green, being duly sworn, deposes and states as follows:
1. I am a licensed surveyor, licensed as such under the laws of the state of Utah.
2. I performed a survey of Section 32, Township 3 North, Range 6 East, Salt Lake Base
and Meridian, which survey is dated September 24,2003, and was filed with the Summit County
Surveyor's Office according to Utah Code Ann. §17-23-1 on or about December 10,2004, as
Survey No. S-5664.
3. I also performed a survey covering Sections 28,29,32, N lA 33, Lot 3 Middle Canyon
Ranch, Township 3 North, Range 6 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, which survey is dated
April 5,2001, and was filed with the Summit County Surveyor's Office according to Utah Code
Ann. § 17-23-1 on or about July 11,2001, as Survey No> S-4041.
4. The location of the common corner to sections 29,30, 31 and 32 of Township 3 North,
Range 6 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and the boundary between Section 31 and Section 32
were the subject of a civil lawsuit, Case No. 040500429, filed in the Third Judicial District
Court, in and for Summit County, State of Utah. The Court in that case entered a Memorandum
Decision on October 4,2006 concerning the common corner and the boundary line between
Sections 31 and 32. The Court's Decision states, in part, on page 21 of the Memorandum
Decision:
[T]he court concludes that the true boundary line between sections 31 and 32 at
the north end of those sections is where it was shown on the Malan and
1

Christensen surveys, where Wilde and many others saw the government stone,
where the 1977-78 fence was erected. The boundary line then proceeds southerly
and westerly to the point at the south end of sections 31 and 32 which is not
disputed and shown on all surveys, including Green's. That is the true boundary
and title is quieted in each section to that boundary line.
A true and complete copy of the Court's Memorandum Decision dated October 4,2006 is
attached hereto. A copy of the Court's Order and Judgment signed by Judge Bruce C. Lubeck on
December 8,2006 and filed with the clerk of the court on December 11,2006, is also attached
hereto.

DATED this /J^

day of March, 2007.

Notary Public
REED D. SCOW

£/SL«^

/6

Dannie B. Green

1576 West AQQ South
Hurricane UT 84737
My Commission Expires
N o v r m b r r 2 7 2010

State of Utah

SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me this

G .day of March, 2007.

Notary
iNotary Public
ruoiic i
Residing at: HfiflrxM&C-r
My Commission Expires:

2

i j
[A<^

2)002/027

1 0 / 0 6 / 2 0 0 6 1 1 . 5 1 FAX

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTYr STATE OF UTAH
HELEN W. BOYER, TRUSTEE
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Plaintiff,
Case No, 040500429

vs.
Judge BRUCE C. LUBECK
THOMAS VERN BOYER and FEWKES
CANYON, LLC,
Defendants.

DATE: October 4, 2006

The above matter came before the court for a bench trial on
September 27, 28 and 29, 2006. Plaintiff was present with Ray G.
Martineau and Brett D. Cragun and defendants were present with
and through Robert H, Wilde.

BACKGROUND
Plaintiff filed a complaint June 26, 2004. A second amended
complaint was filed August 4, 2005.
The second amended complaint alleged plaintiff was the
trustee of the L.E. and Helen W. Boyer Revocable Trust.

It

alleged in summary that plaintiff and her predecessors are title
holders of Section 31, Township 3 North, Range 6 East, Salt Lake
Base and Meridian, according to an 1874 U.S. Survey.

Defendants

are legal title holders to Section 32. For more than twenty
years the owners agreed that a common true boundary was marked by
a fence erected in 1977 or 1978. In July 2003, defendant took out
the recognized fenc;e ana erected a new fence inside the eastern
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boundary of Section 31.
The second amended complaint alleges (1) tortous (sic)
misconduct by defendant Boyer, (2) seeks removal of the new fence
and erection of the former fence, and in cause four (claim three
against Green has been dismissed) seeks a declaratory judgment
that the old fence was and is the true boundary line and (5)
seeks punitive damages based on the wilful nature of the conduct.
The court has made several rulings in the case.

On February

7, 2006, the court dismissed the case against defendant Greenr a
surveyor hired by defendants, The claims against him were
essentially that his 2003 survey, upon which defendants' relied
in removing the old fence and erecting the new fence, was faulty
and without foundation and in violation of survey standards.
On July 26, 2006, the court denied the parties' cross
motions for summary judgment, ruling factual questions existed as
to the boundary and the court reaffirmed the dismissal of Green.

Thus, the issue in this case is the location of a common
boundary between two sections, section 31 owned by plaintiff and
section 32 owned by defendant Fewkes, formerly owned by defendant
Tom Boyer.

At the end of plaintiff's case defendants moved under Rule
41(b) for a dismissal.

The court reserved on the motion and
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addresses it herein in these findings.

The court beard evidence, received exhibits, heard argument
of counsel, and is fully advised*

The court finds as follows:

FINDINGS OF FACT
1. Joseph and Lois Boyer owned land in the Chalk Creek area
of Summit County, near Coalville.

What has happened to their

land since their death is the subject of this dispute, Joseph
died in 1967 and Lois died in 1971.

They had several children:

Joseph LaVern (Vern), Lyle, William, Leah Nielson, (the only
daughter), Edison (Ted) and Fay Boyer,
2. Tom Boyer, defendant, is the grandson of Joseph and Lois
through Tom's father Vern, who is the brother of Lyle Boyer, the
deceased spouse of plaintiff,
3. Tom Boyer received section 32 and Lyle Boyer received
section 31 through the chain of title to be described below.
Just what those sections entailed and now entail is at issue in
this case.
4. On October 3, 2003, Tom Boyer sold section 32 to
defendant Fewkes, a limited liability company, whose managing
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member is Tom's son Jeremy Boyer.

In November 2003 Fewkes

conveyed approximately 6 acres to Jeremy Boyer.
5. Plaintiff is the trustee of the Lyle and Helen Boyer
Revocable Trust, and the wife of Lyle Boyer, now deceased, and
thus the aunt of Tom Boyer.
6. Plaintiff is the record title owner of section 31. Both
sections 31 and 32 are in Township 3 North, Range 6 Bast, 5LBSM,
U.S. Survey.
7. Lyle Boyer acquired property through an executor's deed
from the estate of his parents, Joseph and Lois Boyer- That deed
was executed by one of the co-executors, William Boyer, another
son of Joseph and Lois, on July 31, 1979, and that deed conveyed
a good deal of other land and included ^Section 31, [listing
township and range as above], U.S. Survey, containing 623,6
acres, more or less/' subject to the probate decree mineral
rights.

Lyle Boyer then quit claimed that same property with the

identical description as to section 31 on June 14, 1988, to the
trust named as plaintiff herein.
8. Tom Boyer acquired section 32 from his father Vern Boyer.
Also on July 31, 1979, William Boyer as co-executor executed an
executor's deed conveying property to Joseph LaVern Boyer, (Vern
Boyer) and that included "Section 32 [naming the same township
and range] containing 640 acres, more or less." It thus differs
from the executor's deed concerning section 31 in that this
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section 32 executor's deed did not use the words "U.S. Survey."
It was also subject to mineral rights under the probate decree.
Vern Boyer by quit claim deed conveyed the same property,
including the same description as to Section 32, to Tom and Vern
Boyer Land and Livestock,, a Utah partnership, on October 13,
1982.

The Tom and Vern Boyer Land and Livestock company executed

a warranty deed on May 11, 1995, to Tom Boyer and his wife.

That

property consisted of, among other property, Section 32 with the
same description as the deed by which it was acquired,

Tom Boyer

and his wife, by warranty deed executed October 7, 2003, conveyed
"All of Section 32 [same range and township3 to Fewkes.
deed

That

did not contain any note as to acreage. As noted Fewkes

conveyed a few acres to Jeremy Boyer and is wife the next month
in 2003.
3* In the lifetime of Joseph and Lois Boyer sections 31 and
32 were fenced around their perimeter, along with other sections
not at issue in this case.

However, there was no fence between

sections 31 and 32 during the lives of Joseph and Lois. A fence
was first erected between sections 31 and 32 in 1977 or 1978 as
will be described below.
10. Long ago, at a date not revealed by the testimony, but
evidently not long after the deaths of Joseph and Lois, a dispute
arose between Vern Boyer (and his son Tom Boyer) and Lyle Boyer
concerning the boundary between section 31 and section 32. Tom
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Boyer thus commissioned a licensed surveyor, Fred Malan, who did
a survey in 1976.
1976.

Malan conducted that work on August 7 and 14,

Tom Boyer accompanied Fred Malan on those two days, as did

Malan's son Kent, who was assisting his fathercertified report a year later, in September 1977>

Malan prepared a
That report

indicated that Malan located a rock with markings on the north
boundary of the line between sections 31 and 32.

Section 32 lies

east of section 31/ and north of section 31 is section 30 owned
by Judd and north of section 32 and east of section 30 is section
29.

To the south of section 31 lies section 6 and to the south

of section 32 and to the east of section 6 lies section 5, these
sections 5 and 6 being in another township. Malan certified he
made a survey of the line between sections 31 and 32, The rock
was noted as having 5 notches on the east and one notch on the
south. At one point the certification states the survey was done
for Fay and Tom Boyer, and at another that it was done for Vernon
Boyer, Tom Boyer and Fay Boyer.

Between sections 29 and 30 there

was a fence that was erected before any of these events. The
stone Malan indicated he found was at the intersection between
sections 31 and 32 where the fence between sections 30 and 29
touched the northern edge of sections 31 and 32. The northern
boundary of sections 31 and 32 was also fenced long before these
events to separate the sections north of sections 31 and 32.
11. Not long after the Malan survey, sometime in 1977 or
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1987, Tom Boyer erected a fence between sections 31 and 32.

It

was called by Tom Boyer a "stock" fence and he stated it was only
to keep out livestock, and he did not intend it to be the
boundary as he did not believe that was the proper boundary.
That fence corresponded with the Malan survey, and on the north
boundary the fence began where the fence between sections 30 and
29 ended on the south edge of those sections and the north edge
of sections 31 and 32. There was thus a "four way" fence corner
at the intersections of sections 29, 30, 31, and 32. The fence
was approximately 400 feet east, into section 32, of where Tom
Boyer believed and continues to believe the boundary between
section 31 and 32 should be.

The fence went south and westerly,

and was erected by Tom Boyer.
12. That Malan plat was recorded by Vern Boyer, who recorded
it October 9, 1980, along with an affidavit from Vern Boyer which
stated that Malan located the "corner section corner common to
sections 31 and 32 . . .and sections 5 and 6 « . •"

Attached was

a copy of the Malan survey dated September 1977.
13. Disputes still continued between Tom and Lyle Boyer as
to the boundary. Tom Boyer commissioned another survey in 1985
from Bing Christensen, also a licensed surveyor. Christensen did
a survey June 4, 1985, and prepared a drawing showing the
results, including stone monuments and fence corner posts he
found and accepted as evidence of the location of corresponding
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section corners.

Christensen provided two affidavits to that

effect, one in October of an unknown year and one in October
2001.

That map shows a stone was located at the

XA

where sections 31 and 32 meet, on the north edge.

fence corner"
What was

labeled as a ^section corner stone" was found on the southwest
corner of section 31 and another section corner stone was located
at the southeast corner of section 32. A "fence comer" was
labeled on the boundary of sections 31 and 32 at the south edge.
14. Disputes continued and a meeting was held at the request
of Tom Boyer at the Summit County Courthouse in Coalville in
October 1985.

Present were Tom Boyer, his lawyer Wendell

Bennett, Lyle Boyer, Bing Christensen, Kent Wilde, Sam Lewis, who
leased section 31 from plaintiff, and Ron Baxter. Baxter and
Wilde were surveyors Lyle had hired in the past. The boundary
between the sections was discussed and out of that meeting
further confusion arose.

Some claim there was an agreement and

some claim there was not.

The court finds that all agreed that

the fence erected by Tom Boyer was the correct boundary line that
everyone would live with.

Correspondence between Bennett,

representing Tom Boyer, and Lyle Boyer followed.

Bennett stated

to Lyle the temporary fence was 400 feet too far to the east
(into section 32) at the north end and 50 feet too far east at
the south end of section 32. Bennett enclosed the Christensen
survey. Lyle Boyer responded that he had tried to locate the
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section line between the two sections. Lyle referred to receiving
the Malan survey and it showed the fence built by Tom Boyer was
the true line,

Lyle stated he believed the Christensen and Malan

surveys both showed the fence put up by Tom Boyer in about 197778 was in the right place, Lyle agreed to maintain the southern
half and Tom would maintain the northern half of that fence, as
Bennett had proposed.

After the October 1985 meeting Bennett

again wrote Lyle and stated concerning the fence Tom built in
1977-78 that "we have now agreed to recognize as the boundary
line between sections 31 and 32 until such a time as the
government authority charged with the responsibility . . . reestablishes those corner markers as between sections 31 and 32 .
« . Until [a further government survey occurs) we agreed to honor
the fence line as described in the enclose document, which was
established by Bing Christensen

. . [and which was agreed to by

Kent Wilde.]" The Bennett letter attached a description that was
based somewhat on the Christensen survey, but it did not exactly
trace that map, but began at the southwest corner of section 31,
then north along a fence, then east 5288 feet to the four-corner
fence line made between sections 29, 30, 31, and 32.

Lyle Boyer

wrote back in early 1986 and stated the existing fence could stay
where it was located and he would maintain the southern half and
Tom the northern half.

Bennett in June 1986 asked Lyle to sign

the agreement and that was never done.

-9-
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court finds that there was an agreement but Tom Boyer was not
happy or satisfied about it.

No written agreement was ever

executed and that agreement has no legal significance but informs
the court as to credibility issues.
15. Because of the continuing disagreement, Tom Boyer
commissioned yet another survey, by Green or Alta Surveying, in
2003.

Green's survey, working for ALTA Survey, formed the basis

of later action by Tom Boyer.

Green's survey indicated the

boundary between sections 31 and 32 was approximately 420 feet
west, or into section 31, of where Malan and Chrlstensen had
placed the northern boundary.

That is, the fence running between

sections 29 and 30, where it touched the northern boundary of
sections 31 and 32, was incorrect, and the true boundary was west
420 at the north end and about 50 west at the southern end.

If

the line was where Tom erected the fence in 1977 a spring at the
southern end of the properties was partly in section 31 and
partly in section 32.

If the Green survey is correct, and the

newly erected 2003 fence reflects the true boundary, that spring
is entirely within section 32. Water rights are not at issue in
this case.
Based on the Green survey, Tom Boyer removed the fence he
had erected in 1977-78 and erected a new fence along the line
shown as the boundary by Green, that is, about 420 feet to the
west, at the north end, of where the old fence was and about 50
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the 187a U.S. Survey, the conveyance deeds, the 1967 topographic
map, the acreage involved, as well as other factors.

He

concluded that the 1977-7B fence was not the boundary line but
the boundary line is where the 2003 fence was erected by Tom
Boyer after the Green survey.

The original plat of 1874 shows

section 31 is "short" and consists of 623.6 acres and section 32
consists of 640 acres.
Green had done another survey in the area, for a person
named Henrie, in 2001.

Henrie was interested in purchasing

section 28 and some of section 33, and so Green obtained
documents and information from neighboring land owners, including
Tom Boyer, to conduct that survey. Green also obtained a title
company title report which was suppose to contain the public
documents. Later in 2003, after Tom Boyer heard of Green and his
2001 survey, Tom Boyer asked Green to establish the boundary
between sections 31 and 32. Green later concluded, after talking
to some of the surveyors of plaintiff, that they were wrong and
he was right.

Green opined that plaintiffs surveyors had simply

accepted the "stone" they found without "testing" it against
other information, as Green did*

Thus, Green opined as he did*

Green filed a survey for Henrie, and it varies in some
regards from the Tom Boyer survey of 2003, which was filed in
2004 with the recorder. (There is no Summit County surveyor, so
surveys are filed with the county recorder.)
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described the stone a bit differently but as being in the same
location as the four corner fence area, where the 1977-78 fence
was erected going south, Tom Boyer testified he did not see such
a stone ever, nor did his son Jeremy. Tom went to the site with
Malanr Christensen, and at other times. The court credits the
testimony of Wilde and others more than Tom Boyer concerning this
government stone and its location.

The description of the stone

convinces the court not that they are wrong, but that they are
being honest.

The court does not indicate or imply Tom Boyer

caused the removal of the stone, but the court credits the
testimony of the many persons who saw the stone at the point
where the Malan and Christensen surveys indicate it was.

That

is, where the fence line coming from the north between sections
29 and 30 joins the northern boundary of sections 31 and 32, or
where the 1977-78 fence was erected by Tom Boyer.
18. The court finds from its own common sense as well as the
expert testimony elicited, that the field notes from 1874 were
not completely accurate as to what are called the topographic
calls.

The topographic map shows, for example, a ridge or gulch

or stream, and the field notes from 1874 indicate those were in
different places from what the topographic map shows.

The

survey's field notes from 1874 would say, for example, that from
point A it was "X chains (converted* into feet and inches) to a
M

ridge."

Of course just where a ridge begins and ends is hard to
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would be accurate.

The bids to again "clear" that already

reasonably clear area are found not to be realistic.

As to the

alleged damages for remediation, as to planting new aspen trees
or other vegetation, the evidence was not compelling just what
was removed when the 2003 fence was erected. Certainly some trees
were moved, but there was no sufficient evidence as to how many
nor the value of those.

Moreover/ it was not shown why indeed

concerning this range land there needs to be any remediation as
evidently over the many years this land has been in the Boyer
family there has never been any such reforesting or replanting of
grasses.

The damages must be proven, though of course they need

not be with specificity.

They may not be the subject of

conjecture, and the court believes the estimates provided are
just that-conjecture. The costs for halting erosion or the spread
of weeds appears to be the subject of government regulation, but
it was not shown that moving the 2003 fence back to the 1977-78
fence location would cause any erosion or weed problems that must
be budgeted for 10 years.

Moreover, this being rangeland it is

not clear to the court that any such costs are legitimate in any
fashion.

Based on the above findings and discussion, the court makes
the following:
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weighed.

The court has done just that.

2. The court concludes that the government stone was
observed before 1985 and in 1985.

Its authenticity cannot

reasonably be questioned. Defendant's evidence was the direct
testimony of Tom Boyer that he had looked for a monument and had
failed to find it/ spending perhaps 30 hours in so doing.

The

other witnesses for defendant, William Boyer through his
deposition and a letter from Lyle Boyer, are found to be less
convincing than the witnesses who testified they actually saw the
stone.

There is certainly a conflict whether the stone was at a

common boundary, but on balance the court concludes it was.

The

testimony of Kent wilde is particularly telling and informative.
While legally insignificant, Tom Boyer's testimony about an
October 1985 meeting is some influence to the court.

Several

persons were there and presented testimony that after Tom Boyer
erected the fence in 1977-78, he still disputed its position as
being correct, so he a6ked for a meeting.

Of all the people who

attended, everyone including his attorney indicated there was an
agreement that the fence would remain where Tom Boyer had erected
it and the fence would be the boundary.

There is certainly some

language in the correspondence indicating some conflicts, but the
court has found there was an agreement. Again, that is not of any
legal significance as to the boundary but to the court it deals
with credibility in that Tom Boyer then, many years later,

-18-

10/08/2008 111 :58 f VX

commissioned yet another survey and ultimately -"hanged the fence.
That shows t-* ^

"

*

* ^t* *-**

-

v

cd' 1 i •

ifhnr1 who
urvt" y ifi

2003 iid ^.

VL-.U-,V

observed

t

J.^JJ

^urt/ _

~i *

evidencH
' ' **>« , .^

t- '••• i

field notes

. o -u>u*

e m u found and

: insufficient weight in the

Gree^ ^eli^ 1

%

^~

* *••***)ti on of tbo

'

came

id In

rii.j. -.-^.lu.
r n m ^ s CiMd ferro p J?~ZS observe

Furtherr there ~*
others

«. n/,- -" r

- ^

» -n at that.

,
N

nd placed by

and evidence fron

< h^rs who saw

consider

: • :>i :i sidered
,ourt that is

r-*..-

rejects h lb -^.-"

.-.* u,a5o

>ue boundaia

plaintiff alleges/ however-

;
weight i

s

*:*;-,

.-

presence
-

"racing

.3 showing the
faulty as

Green simply disagreed wi 1 :.h • : thers

. .„

vs\> ..: leased

^ttouz^

a:\^ I^JLJ-

*-*o neav iv

questionable field notes over the government stone.
not

see

the

npfttr-ii'

stonp

in

i' i " '

^1)01 in

/(KM,

|nil

!u« llhhinl m< " il i fnnef

" 111 * i ]-.. , a IAACH

ceititied surveys so showing.

Green did •
fi

in nil In i:

and lit- Lid possession v-f

The court does no!; believe Green

failed to obtai n sufficient information from Tom Boyer as Green
had public documents through the title report, though both the

-19-

3021/027

10/0B/20O6 11:59 FAX

title report and Green failed to discover the 1985 Christensen
survey which was of record and had been recorded by Vern Boyer in
1980.

Green had no reason to contact Kent Wilde as Wilde had not

filed a survey of this area.

Green did not but certainly should

have contacted adjacent landowners including plaintiff, but Green
did have, as noted, the field notes from the 1874 survey and his
task was to retrace that survey*

He had the topographic map from

1967 and there was no stone shown on that map, nor w a s there a
stone located at the site in 2003.

Green did not file an

amendment to the 2001 Henrie survey, but the later 2003 survey
and the narratives involved make clear that in practical effect
the 2003 survey was an amendment to the 2001 survey.

Green thus

did not completely fail to follow standard principals to any
degree approaching plaintiff r s claims of wilfulness or
professional incompetence. Green's survey, while the court
concludes it was not sufficiently based on clear and available
evidence of a section corner monument, was not done in wilful
disregard of standard principles of surveying*

It w a s merely

wrong and based on other evidences Green felt more important than
the government monument evidence.

Indeed, survey principles do

not call for a "blind" adherence to a government monument if that
monument is too questionable according to all evidence.

However,

as the court understands it, Green used the 1874 field notes and
examined terrain and topography and naturally occurring signs.
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4- The conveyance deeds indeed were intended to convey
certain properties to the heirs of Joseph and Lois Boyer, There
were six children involved, including Vern and Lyle, five sons
and one daughter.

The court concludes, from all the evidence,

that the conveyance deeds were not unambiguous and extrinsic
evidence was thus allowed- The deeds were ambiguous because the
deeds stated a specific legal description (section 31 or 32) PLUS
an acreage amount. The deed to Lyle stated VS Survey.

The deed

to Vern did not. Those create an ambiguity. The court finds and
concludes that the intent of Joseph and Lois is what the court
must determine, as the co-executors were then to continue to
execute that intent and convey what Joseph and Lois intended.
From examining the probate documents in evidence, as well as the
deposition of William Boyerf the executor who executed the deeds
concerning these sections, and considering all the extrinsic
evidence, the court concludes that it was the intent of Joseph
and Lois Boyer, to convey section 31, whatever that section was
according to the U.S. Survey, to Lyle Boyer.

Similarly, it was

the intent of Joseph and Lois Boyer to convey all of section 32/
whatever that was according to the U.S. Survey, to Vern Boyer.
There was not any evidence that clearly and unequivocally shows
an intent by Joseph and Lois Boyer to convey any set amount of
land.

These sections conveyed were only part of the land

conveyed by the executor's deeds, which conveyed other property
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any other fence would cost anywhere near what plaintiff's
evidence showed.

The court rejects all the testimony about

damages and concludes that plaintiff has not proven any damages
resulting from the removal of the 1977-78 fence or the erection
of the 2003 fence.
6. The claim of bad faith as to Green has been fully
rejected.
resolve.

The claim of bad faith as to Tom Boyer is harder to
Certainly Tom Boyer would argue that he acted, in

taking down the 1977-78 fence and erecting the 2003 fence, that
he acted on the basis of a legitimately commissioned survey.
That is certainly true*

However, the pause the court engages in

is to ask itself why Tom Boyer felt any need to commission the
2003 survey.

He had asked Malan and Christensen to do a survey

and they did so, each certifying the boundary line at a place
where plaintiff claims it to be.

He agreed to others that was

the situation in the October 1985 meeting-

He still could not

seem to leave it, however, for some reason, and so had still
another survey conduct work.

That is the difficult point the

court struggles with, why, based on what, did Tom Boyer even
commission Green.

Tom Boyer, after having the Green survey; did

not even approach his aunt, plaintiff, an elderly woman, and
explain what he was doing or why. He merely acted and moved a
fence.

It certainly is unexplainable to the court why someone

would so behave,

whatever past disputes had existed between Vern
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and Lyle could have and should have been forgotten long ago. Both
were deceased.

Tom Boyer, for whatever reason, continued to

press the matter and asked for yet another survey.

If such

conduct is not in bad faith, it is certainly mystifying to the
court.

Tom Boyer seemed, however, to the court to be a sensible

person in other areas of his life,

Based on a consideration of

all factors, many no doubt unknown to the court, the court cannot
find his actions in bad faith.
7. Defendants' position as to the boundary, after the 2003
Green survey, is definitely not in bad faith and without support.
No fees should be awarded to either party. There has been no
wilful conduct and punitive damages are not awarded.
8. Plaintiff has shown title to the land up to the boundary
as found herein.

Thus, plaintiff's causes of action for tortious

conduct has been shown, but no damages have been proven.

The

court declares the boundary between sections 31 and 32 to be as
herein described and quiets title accordingly.
be removed as indicated below.

The fence should

No damages are awarded and of

course no punitive damages.
9. The court believes it probably cannot force this result
or force any cooperation but believes that what makes sense in
this c*$e

is for the existing 2003 fence to be relocated to the

boundary as found herein.
effective for its purposes.

It is a quality fence, lasting and
Rather than have it torn down, new

-25-

©027/027

10/06/2008 12.00 FAX

materials purchased and a new "range" fence erected (which fence
would require far more maintenance and possibly engender further
disputes) it seems a practical solution for defendant to move the
existing 2003 fence onto the new boundary.

Plaintiff is to prepare an order in compliance with URCP,
Rule 7(f) setting forth this ruling.

DATED this

^I

day of
of L--(
C- /
day

/ , 2006.

BY THE^COURT^

BRUCE C» LUBECK
DISTRICT COURT
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ROBERT H. WILDE #3466
ROBERT H. WILDE, ATTORNEY AT LAW, P.C.
Attorneys for Defendants
935 East South Union Avenue Suite D-102
Midvale, Utah 84047
Telephone: (801) 255-4774
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ooOoo
HELEN BOYER, A TRUSTEE,

ORDER AND JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
vs.
Civil No. 040500429 MJ
THOMAS VERN BOYER & FEWKES
CANYON, L.L.C.;
Judge Bruce Lubeck
Defendants.
ooOoo
This matter came on regularly for trial to the court on
September 27, 28, and 29, 2006.

Plaintiff was represented by Ray

G. Martineau and Brett D. Cragun and Defendants were represented by
Robert H. Wilde. The court having previously made findings of fact
and reached conclusions of law;
Now therefore it is hereby ordered, adjudged, and decreed;
1.

Title is quieted between Sections 31 and 32,

Township 3

North, Range 6 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, in that the
section line between these two sections is determined to run in a
L:\D\12139\Judgment.vpd

1

straight line in an approximately northern direction from the
acknowledged common southern corner of the two sections to former
location of the government monument at the existing south fence
corner between sections 29 and 30 Township 3 North, Range 6 East,
Salt Lake Base and Meridian, where the 1977-78 fence previously
existed.
2.

The Plaintiff's claim for damages is denied. Damages were

not proven by a preponderance of the evidence.
3.

There is no statute or contract which allows attorney

fees in this matter. The request for attorney fees is denied.
4.

No bad faith was proven. The request for punitive damages

is denied.
5.

The court urges the parties to cooperate in moving the

fence from its current location to the section line found in
paragraph one of tjiis order.
DATED this

)S

-±r—
Bruce C. Lubeck
District Judge

L:\D\12135\Judgmenc.wpd
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Delivery Certificate
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing
Order and Judgment was mailed to the following via first class
mail, postage prepaid thereon, this

[0? day of N0l/lMW&^

2006.
Ray G. Martineau
Anthony R. Martineau
Brett D. Cragun
3098 Highland Drive, Suite 450
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106

U/ji^jl^t

nc.vpd

V^nno^>

,

STATE OF UTAH
County of Summit

}

'. 38.

I, Alan Spriggs, Summit County Recorder, State of Utah, designated as
depositor for Survey plats filed in compliance with Section 17 23-17 Utah C* A9
Annotated, do hereby certify that the attached is a full, true and correct copy of
that certain £%%c&tW- filed on the /srTt, day of rVa^oL. 20 Q7 .
as File No. (y
S-£YKS.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and,
official seal, this / ^ r day of Q^tJU^
, 2007 .
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
HELEN BOYER, Trustee,
RULING and ORDER
Plaintiff,
Case No. 040500429
vs.
Honorable BRUCE C. LUBECK
THOMAS VERN BOYER, FEWKES
CANYON LLC, and DANNIE B.
GREEN,

DATE: February 7, 2006

Defendants.

The above matter came before the court on February 6, 2006,
for oral argument on various motions.

Plaintiff was present with

Ray G. Martineau, and defendants Boyer and Fewkes were present
through Robert H. Wilde and defendant Green was present through
John N. Braithwaite.
Green filed a motion to dismiss or in the alternative
motion for summary judgment on August 31, 2005. Boyer and Fewkes
filed a concurrence with the motion on September 6, 2005.
Plaintiff filed an opposition response on October 4, 2005.
Plaintiff filed an opposition on October 12, 2005. Green filed a
reply on November 2, 2005, as well as a notice to submit.
Boyer and Fewkes moved on October 12, 2005, to strike the
expert report of Stahl. Plaintiff filed an opposition response on
October 31, 2005. Boyer filed a reply on November 9, 2005.
Plaintiff filed a notice to submit this motion on November 14,
2005.
Oral argument was scheduled previously and postponed and
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then held February 6, 2006. The court took the matter under
advisement.

The court has reviewed the pleadings of the parties, heard
oral argument, and concludes as follows.

BACKGROUND
Plaintiff filed a complaint June 28, 2004.

After motion and

argument, the court allowed an amended complaint to be filed.
Plaintiff filed a second amended complaint on August 4, 2005.

In

summary, that complaint alleged plaintiff is the trustee of the
L.E. Boyer and Helen W. Boyer Revocable Trust.

The plaintiff

alleged that she and her predecessors have an interest and record
title in Section 31 TS3N, R6E in Summit County, which boundaries
were set in 1875 by a U.S. Survey. Boyer and Fewkes have an
interest in adjoining Section 32, and the complaint alleges that
the common boundary between those two sections has been marked by
a fence erected in 1977 or 1978. In July, 2003, defendant Boyer
attempted to change the location of the boundary by removing the
old fence which served as the boundary and erecting a new fence
that impinges upon Section 31 owned by plaintiff. Green was
engaged to survey the boundary in May 2002 by Boyer and it is
alleged Boyer mislead Green by failing to provide certain
documents, and Green negligently and unprofessionally failed to
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perform his duties properly, and thus improperly advised Boyer as
to the boundary.

Green also filed a plat in December, 2004, and

thus clouded title to Section 31.
The complaint alleges causes of action for (1) tortious
conduct against Boyer; (2) she seeks an order requiring Boyer to
replace the old fence and remove the new fence; (3) alleges
negligent conduct against Green in undertaking the survey; (4)
seeks declaratory judgment as to the common boundary; and (5)
seeks punitive damages against Boyer for his willful conduct.

ARGUMENTS
1.

MOTION TO DISMISS,

ALTERNATIVELY

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.

Green moves to dismiss under rule 12(b) (6), or alternatively
for summary judgment on all claims against him, alleging those
are for negligence and for wrongful lien and slander of title.
Only causes three and four are alleged against Green.
Green asserts as facts that he performed a survey at the
behest of Boyer to determine the boundary of Section 32. Green
filed a survey plat with the Summit County Surveyor's Office.
As to the filing of the plat, Green contends that the fourth
cause of action is for wrongful lien.

The filing of the survey

by Green under UCA 17-23-17 is not a wrongful lien, as it does
not purport to create an encumbrance or lien on real property,
and the filing of the plat is authorized by Utah statute.

-3-

Further, Green is not a lien claimant, as he claims no interest
in any of the properties involved. Further, because under Utah
law the plat was filed with the county recorder as there is no
county surveyor, the filing was not with the recorder and so no
wrongful lien could be created.
As to the negligence claim, Green performed the work for
defendant Boyer, not plaintiff, and he owed no independent duty
to plaintiff. Contract duties ran to Boyer, not plaintiff. As
there was no duty to plaintiff, no negligence claim can be valid.
Green attaches his affidavit.
In opposition, plaintiff disputes that Fewkes owns Section
32 as there is a contest over a corner of that section.
Plaintiff also disputes the survey by Green, alleging it was
negligently performed. Plaintiff alleges earlier surveys, from
1875 and 1974, showed the common boundary between Section 31 and
32, and that boundary was marked by the fence erected in
approximately 1978, well before defendant Boyer put up a new
fence in 2003. A 1960 survey by Clark showed that there was a
common corner between sections 29, 30, 31 and 32.

A fence was

erected based on that 1960 survey and it marked the boundary.

In

the early 1960s a survey was done by Burton which confirmed the
fence as the north boundary of Section 31.

In 1976 a survey was

done by Malan on Section 32 which also confirmed the old fence as
the common boundary. In 1978 Wilde undertook to retrace the Malan

-4-

000287

survey for plaintiff's husband and did so, locating the stone
that had been placed by Malan. Based on that, defendant Boyer
installed a fence on the common boundary. In 1985 Christensen did
a survey at the request of Boyer which confirmed the boundary.
Boyer is claimed to have agreed in 1985 that the Malan,
Christensen, and Wilde surveys accurately located the fence and
common boundary.
Boyer and Kent Henrie, owner of Section 29, hired Green in
2002 and Green did a survey that year and prepared a plat
purporting to place the location of the north end of the common
boundary approximately 500 feet west of the common corner,
thereby taking approximately 25 acres from Section 31 and adding
them to Section 32. Boyer did not provide information he knew and
had acknowledged to Green and Green did not find an affidavit on
file with the county recorder concerning Sections 31 and 32, and
Green, though aware of Wilde and his survey, did not contact him
nor seek his input, nor did Green contact plaintiff and Green did
not follow standard procedures for surveying. Boyer then wilfully
removed the old fence he had previously erected and completed a
new fence between Sections 31 and 32 according to the Green
survey. Wilde has since then informed Green of his errors, but
Green refuses to acknowledge those errors and will not amend his
plat that was filed in December, 2004.

Plaintiff argues there is

a duty to neighboring landowners by surveyors, regardless of who
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hires them, a duty in tort not affected by a contractual
relationship.
As to the lien claim, plaintiff claims again the plat was
wrongly filed as it is incorrect, as the result of negligence.
Even though Green is not a lien claimant, the statute provides a
wrongful lien by any person may be compensable.
In reply Green challenges plaintiff's disputes as not being
relevant, as the issues are issues of law.

The court should

interpret the recording of the plat as a matter of law, not fact.
Green asserts it is immaterial what the previous surveys showed
or did not show.

Green argues as a matter of Utah law there is

no duty to plaintiff and thus there can be no negligence.

As to

the lien claim, Green again argues the plat was authorized by law
to be recorded with the recorder instead of the surveyor, it was
"filed" and not "recorded" and is simply not a lien.
As to the slander of title claim, plaintiff has not alleged
and cannot prove that any action of Green was with malice.
Further, plaintiff can show no special damages.
Boyer's arguments in favor of dismissal as to Green urge
that plaintiff has at most alleged negligence against Green.

The

second amended complaint does not allege a wrongful lien. The
complaint does not allege malice or wilfulness against Green.
Plaintiff has not pleaded slander of title.

Plaintiff has not

relied on the survey which is allegedly defective. If the survey
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is in error, plaintiff can be compensated and recover against the
other defendants.

If the survey is correct, there would be no

damages.
2. MOTION TO STRIKE

EXPERT

REPORT OF

STAHL.

Boyer moves to strike the expert report of John B. Stahl.
Boyer argues that the Rule 26(f) plan was submitted and expert
reports were to be submitted by April 30, 2005.

Further, the

report contains improper legal conclusions.
Plaintiff opposes the motion.

Plaintiff argues that she

learned on December 15, 2004, that Green had filed his survey on
December 10, 2004.

Thus, plaintiff sought to add Green as a

defendant and that was allowed July 18, 2005. Plaintiff had no
reason to file an expert report until that was allowed. As to the
content, that is for the weight and does not go to whether the
report should be filed.
In reply Boyer argues plaintiff has an expert, Wilde, and
that Stahl is merely surplus and is late and if allowed as an
expert, would have to be deposed.

DISCUSSION
2. MOTION TO DISMISS,

OR FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.

The court treats the motion as one for summary judgment as
there are attachments to the motion which have not been stricken.
This is a most interesting question, made more difficult by
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Green's reading of the complaint.

The court does not read the

complaint as does Green.
Previously, the court allowed the second amended complaint
so plaintiff could file a wrongful lien claim.

The court does

not see in the second amended complaint a direct cause of action
for wrongful lien, though plaintiff and Green seem to agree such
a cause of action is implied.

As to Green, plaintiff alleges

negligence in the third cause of action and in the fourth, seeks
a declaratory judgment as to the boundary involved. The second
amended complaint incorporates previous allegations, but none
state directly, in the court's reading, that a wrongful lien is
claimed.
As to the wrongful lien claim, if there is one in the second
amended complaint, the court believes it cannot stand.

The court

reads the wrongful lien statute as does Green.
First, Green must be a lien claimant, a person claiming an
interest in the property.

The liability section, UCA 38-9-4,

sets forth possible damages as to the actions of a lien claimant,
not to "any person, " UCA 38-9-4(3), but to "a person" which
refers to the previous subsections (1) and (2), which require a
lien claimant. Plaintiff reads UCA 38-9-4(3) as allowing a claim
by any person, and the court believes that statute applies only
to lien claimants.
Thus, the court need not consider whether this was a
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"wrongful lien" under UCA 38-9-1(6), nor whether any exceptions
thereunder apply.
Green was not and is not a lien claimant and thus there was
and is no wrongful lien filed by Green when he filed the plat.

As to the negligence claim of the third cause of action, the
court again determines this claim under the summary judgment
standard. The court believes there are factual disputes about the
nature of the survey, whether it is correct or not, and both
parties agree there are disputes about the nature of the survey.
As in any negligence claim, it is a rare case where summary
judgment is proper. However, if there is no legal duty, factual
disputes about whether there has been a breach of the duty are
not important.
Green asserts the court can and should determine as a matter
of law that there was no duty owed to plaintiff and thus there
can be no negligence as a matter of law, whatever the merits of
the dispute about the validity of the survey.
The court agrees with Green that it can and should determine
if there is a duty owed as a matter of law.

The court, as a

matter of public policy, determines there is not a duty owed by a
surveyor such that a tort of negligence will lie whenever a
property owner claims the survey is incorrect under circumstances
such as this case.

If any adjoining property owner could claim
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negligence against a surveyor who disagrees with other surveyors,
there would be no reason whatever that defendant Boyer could not
file a negligence claim against Kent Wilde or others who
performed a previous survey.
The court understands the concerns of plaintiff and
expresses some sympathy for the situation and believes it is a
close and interesting question.

If a surveyor can file whatever

survey plat he desires, without regard to its correctness
(plaintiff's allegation herein, and the court is not stating that
is what happened here) there ought to be a duty to adjoining land
owners to make sure the survey is correct.

This case shows the

need, plaintiff asserts, as a policy matter, for such a duty.
Had plaintiff desired to sell the property, the recorded plat,
with the alleged incorrect boundary line, clearly causes possible
damage to plaintiff.
disputed boundary.

She cannot sell the property under the
The filing of the plat, though not subject to

a claim of wrongful lien, certainly operates as an encumbrance on
the property which adjoins the property Green was hired to
survey.

The court understands plaintiff's position that if

certain acts were done or omitted, recovery should occur as there
is a duty to neighboring landowners whose interest is affected by
a survey. The court acknowledges that the survey could and has
affected plaintiff, and an incorrect survey could obviously
affect any neighboring land owners, and any survey which purports
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to "give" land from one section to another clearly impacts more
than the contracting parties to the survey.

A loss of value of

property is certainly an injury that, if caused by negligence,
should be compensable.

However, on balance, as a matter of public policy, where
there allegations in this second amended complaint that will
allow the court to determine the "correctness" of the various
surveys that have been performed, plaintiff is not without a
remedy.

She is without a remedy against Green, or any other

surveyor whose product disagrees with the product of other
surveyors, but she is not without a remedy.
If the courts were to allow, under the circumstances of this
case, such a negligence claim to stand, defendant Boyer could
file a negligence claim against any and all other surveyors who
disagreed with the survey he commissioned, claiming they were
negligently performed and contain incorrect information which
over the years has caused damage to Boyer, as "taking" his
property and being an improper encumbrance on his property. Boyer
could claim he could have sold property belonging to him had he
known the "true" acreage. While in this case plaintiff claims
Green was incorrect, Boyer could then, if the court allowed this
cause of action to remain, file an action against other surveyors
and claim their filings were negligently performed.
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In this case, each surveyor will presumably testify, and the
court will make findings as to the "correct" boundary line, and
issue declaratory judgment as to whether the boundary is where
Green says it is or whether it is somewhere else, where other
surveyors say it is.

That does not mean that each surveyor

should be liable if their work is incorrect, especially in this
situation where there are remedies to find the "correct"
boundary. Allowing negligence suits in such situations as this
would create havoc.
In other cases a negligence claim may lie against a
surveyor, such as a case where a plat is filed by a surveyor and
many people rely on its result to purchase land or otherwise rely
on its incorrect information and can show damages as a result.
Here, where there are competing surveys over a boundary line,
there is no duty of a surveyor that is owed to one such as
plaintiff, an adjoining property owner.
Whether there was a breach of any professional duty remains
to be determined at trial in the ultimate determination of the
"correct" boundary, but the result will be a declaration of the
boundary line and if plaintiff prevails, damages against
defendant Boyer could be assessed.

There should be no claim

against Green for his survey or his filing of the plat.
Thus, the court concludes there is no duty owed and so no
negligence could be shown.

Whether treated as a motion to
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dismiss or a motion for summary judgment, the result is the same.
There is no legal principle which allows recovery against Green.
There is no factual dispute that alters the legal conclusion of
the court as to duty owed.

The parties argued about slander of title and whether that
is included in the second amended complaint.

The court again

does not believe it is pleaded, and the second amended complaint
certainly does not include a claim of malice to support a claim
of slander of title against Green.

Plaintiff suggests that she

ought to be allowed to amend again and correct that deficiency if
it exists.
The court believes the declaratory judgment claim of the
fourth cause of action remains and that claim offers plaintiff a
remedy.
No slander of title cause of action is in the complaint and
to the extent it is "implied" it should be dismissed, as no
malice has been pleaded and the court believes, even though it is
not determining facts at this point, that no malice could be
proven, even if plaintiff is able to show Green was told his
survey was wrong.

Again, to allow a survey to serve as a slander

of title action would allow each surveyor to be sued in competing
survey cases, such as this case. Each property owner relying on a
survey could claim the other survey slandered their title.
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The third cause of action is DISMISSED, Green's motion being
GRANTED.
The fourth cause of action for declaratory judgment remains,
but not as a wrongful lien claim or as a slander of title claim.
Green's motion is GRANTED as to the wrongful lien claim and
slander of title, to the extent they are included in the
complaint.

2. MOTION

TO STRIKE

DEPOSITION

OF

STAHL.

The court understands the timing involved and believes that
based on plaintiff's claims and theories, the additional expert
should be allowed to testify.

No party is restricted in the

number of experts, but of course the court will not allow
needlessly cumulative testimony, even if it is from an expert.
Plaintiff s timing was based on theories held by plaintiff,
rejected above, but those theories are not without merit.
Thus, the court will allow Stahl to be a witness.

His

testimony will be as that of any other expert, and his
conclusions must not invade the legal province of the court.
If defendant desires to depose Stahl, there will be time to
do so.

Assuming the trial is more than one day, any trial to be

set will be several months from now.
The court will not at this point affix fees or costs of the
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deposition.

That will be reserved for trial and the court will

deal with whether plaintiff should be required to pay the fees
and costs involved in deposing Stahl.
The parties are to indicate clearly to each other
immediately what experts will be called so defendants may
determine whether to depose Stahl or not, and the court will not
indicate now who will bear those costs at this point.
The parties are to contact the scheduling clerk soon, in a
joint telephone conference, so that a scheduling conference may
be set with the court, who will then affix a trial date.

This Ruling and Order is the Order of the court and no other
order is required.

DATED this

Y'

day of

, 2006.

BY TH& COUR

BRUCE C. LUBECK
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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